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I. ERISA'S HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND THE SCOPE OF ITS PREEMPTIVE
SCHEME
After a decade long study, Congress enacted the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act ("ERISA")' in 1974 to protect employees, ' participants,3
and beneficiaries," from perceived abuses involving the mismanagement of funds
accumulated to finance various types of employee benefit plans.5 ERISA has
Copyright 1998, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
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writing and completing this article.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1998).
2. ERISA § 3(6), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6) (1998), defines "employee" as "any individual
employed by an employer."
3. ERISA § 3(7), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) (1998), defines "participant" as "any employee or
former employee of an employer, or any member or former member of an employee organization,
who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit of any type from an employee benefit plan which
covers employees of such employer or members of such organization, or whose beneficiaries may
be eligible to receive any such benefit."
4. ERISA § 3(8), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(8) (1998), defines "beneficiary" as "a person designated
by a participant, or by the terms of an employee benefit plan, who is or may become entitled to a
benefit thereunder."
5. Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361, 100 S. Ct. 1723, 1726
(1980).
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been described repeatedly by the Supreme Court as a "comprehensive and
reticulated statute"' with an "interlocking, interrelated, and interdependent
remedial scheme."7 This scheme contains elaborate and complex provisions for
the regulation of employee pension plans' and, to a lesser extent, employee
welfare plans, e.g., plans providing health, disability, severance, and other
miscellaneous, non-pension benefits.9
6. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 116 S. Ct. 1065, 1079 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 251, 113 S. CL 2063, 2066, (1993);
Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 113, 109 S. Ct. 1668, 1671 (1989); Alessi v. Raybestos-
Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 510, 101 S. Ct. 1895, 1899 (1981); Nachman, 446 U.S. at 361, 100
S. Ct. at 1726. The federal appellate courts have likewise characterized the statute. See, e.g., Hunt
v. Hawthorne Assocs., Inc., 119 F.3d 888, 891 (11th Cir. 1997); Central States, Southeast and
Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Mahoning Nat'l Bank, 112 F.3d 252, 255 (6th Cir. 1997); Texas
Life, Accident Health & Hosp. Serv. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Gaylord Entertainment Co., 105 F.3d 210,
215 (5th Cir. 1997); Coyne & Delany Co. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Va., Inc., 102 F.3d 712,
713 (4th Cir. 1996); Central Pa. Teamsters Pension Fund v. McCormick Dray Line, Inc., 85 F.3d
1098, 1107 (3d Cir. 1996); Feins v. American Stock Exch., Inc., 81 F.3d 1215, 1222 (2d Cir. 1996);
Associated Gen. Contractors, San Diego Chapter, Inc., Apprenticeship and Training Trust Fund v.
Smith, 74 F.3d 926, 931 (9th Cir. 1996); Zimmerman v. Sloss Equip., Inc., 72 F.3d 822, 827 (10th
Cir. 1995); Andes v. Ford Motor Co., 70 F.3d 1332, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Health Cost Controls
v. Skinner, 44 F.3d 535, 537 n.4 (7th Cir. 1995); McGee v. Funderburg, 17 F.3d 1122, 1125 (8th
Cir. 1994); Kwatcher v. Mass. Serv. Employees Pension Fund, 879 F.2d 957, 965 (1st Cir. 1989).
7. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146, 105 S. Ct. 3085, 3092
(1985).
8. ERISA § 3(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (1998), defines "employee pension benefit plan"
and "pension plan" as "any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established
or maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that by its
express terms or as a result of surrounding circumstances such plan, fund, or program--(i) provides
retirement income to employees, or (ii) results in a deferral of income by employees for periods
extending to the termination of covered employment or beyond, regardless of the method of
calculating the contributions made to the plan, the method of calculating the benefits under the plan
or the method of distributing benefits from the plan."
9. ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(l) (1998). defines "employee welfare benefit plan" and
"welfare plan" as "any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or
maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that such plan,
fund, or program was established or is maintained for the purpose of providing for its participants
or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or
hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or
unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or day care centers,
scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services, or (B) any benefit described in section 186(c) (of the
Labor Management Relations Act] (other than pensions on retirement or death, and insurance to
provide such pensions)." By referencing § 302(c)(5) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. § 186(c)(5), ERISA § 3(l) expands the definition of benefits covered by ERISA. Section
302(c)(5) of the LMRA was enacted as part of the Labor Management Relations Act or Taft-Hartley
Act of 1947. See Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136-(1947). In 1947, Congress imposed legal
requirements on union-sponsored plans financed by employer contributions. Section 302 makes it
illegal for an employer to provide anything of value to a representative of employees. One exception
to this rule was for employer contributions to employee benefit plans meeting the conditions specified
in Section 302(c)(5). See Employee Benefits Law 4 (BNA, 1991). Among the benefits potentially
covered by ERISA because of the reference to benefits described in Section 302(cX5) are: "medical
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ERISA establishes intricate reporting and disclosure obligations for all
plans,"° provides specific schedules for the vesting, accrual, and funding of
pension benefits," and imposes significant standards of care, duties of loyalty,
and other obligations on fiduciaries and plan administrators" of all ERISA
plans. " Because of the "comprehensive and reticulated" nature of ERISA, the
sponsor of an employee benefit plan" is charged with many obligations,
including determining the eligibility of claimants, calculating benefit levels,
making disbursements, monitoring the availability of funds for benefit
payments, providing appropriate information to participants, and keeping
appropriate records in order to comply with applicable reporting require-
ments.'5
When drafting ERISA, its congressional authors recognized that the most
efficient way to meet these responsibilities was to establish a uniform, federal,
administrative scheme, providing a set of standard procedures to guide
administration of plans, processing of claims, and disbursement of benefits. This
was particularly true in the case of plans covering employees or beneficiaries in
many different states. If a uniform federal system were not devised, those plans
might be required to keep records in some states but not in others; to make
certain benefits available in some states but not in others; to process claims in
a certain way in some states but not in others; and to comply with certain
fiduciary standards in some states but not in others. Additionally, the inefficien-
cies in plan operation caused by such "patchwork" regulation might lead multi-
state employers with existing plans to reduce benefits, and those without such
plans to refrain from adopting them.'
or hospital care, pensions on retirement or death of employees, compensation for injuries or illness
resulting from occupational activity or insurance to provide any of the foregoing, or unemployment
benefits or life insurance, disability and sickness insurance, or accident insurance; ... pooled
vacation, holiday, severance or similar benefits, or defraying costs of apprenticeship or other training
programs: ... scholarships for the benefit of employees, their families, and dependents for study
at educational institutions ... child care centers for preschool and school age dependents of
employees, or ... financial assistance for employee housing: ...... 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5-7)
(1993).
10. ERISA §§ 101-111, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (1998).
II. ERISA §§ 201-306, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1086 (1998).
12. ERISA §§ 401-414, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114 (1998).
13. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 732, 105 S. Ct. 2380, 2385
(1985).
14. ERISA § 3(16)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16XB) (1998), defines "plan sponsor" as "(i) the
employer in the case of an employee benefit plan established or maintained by a single employer,
(ii) the employee organization in the case of a plan established or maintained by an employee
organization, or (iii) in the case of a plan established or maintained by two or more employers or
jointly by one or more employers and one or more employee organizations, the association,
committee, joint board of trustees, or other similar group of representatives of the parties who
establish or maintain the plan."
15. Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 9, 107 S. CtL 2211, 2216 (1987).
16. Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 9-11, 107 S. Ct. at 2216-17.
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This need for a uniform, federal regulatory and administrative scheme
prompted Congress to enact the broadest statutory preemption provision to date.
Section 514(a) of ERISA provides, "[T]he provisions of this title and title IV
shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate
to any employee benefit plan .... ERISA sections 514(c)(1) and 514(c)(2)
define state laws as "[a]ll laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other state actions
having the effect of law, of any State"" including "[a] State, any political
subdivisions thereof, or any agency or instrumentality of either which purports
to regulate, directly or indirectly, the terms and conditions of employee benefit
plans ... ,, " Thus, if ERISA preemption applies, state common law claims,
state law statutes, state law remedies, and/or state regulations are displaced, and
ERISA becomes controlling law.
Although Section 514(a) of ERISA broadly preempts state laws that relate
to an employee benefit plan, that preemption is limited and qualified by a
"saving clause,"2 which states that nothing in ERISA "shall be construed to
exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates
insurance, banking, or securities." The saving clause is then limited by the
"deemer clause,"2' which in turn states that no employee benefit plan, with
certain exceptions not relevant here, "shall be deemed to be an insurance
company or other insurer, bank, trust company, or investment company or to be
engaged in the business of insurance or banking for purposes of any law of any
State purporting to regulate insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust
companies, or investment companies.
22
Although ERISA's preemption provision "[is] not a model of legisla-
tive drafting, 2 3  the Supreme Court has steadfastly described it as
"conspicuous for its breadth,' "clearly expansive, 25  with a "broad
17. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1998).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(cXl)(1998).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(cX2) (1998).
20. ERISA § 514(bX2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(bX2XA) (1998).
21. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § l144(b)(2)(B) (1998).
22. Other rarely litigated exceptions exist to the sweep of ERISA preemption. See ERISA §
514(b)(4)-(8), 29 U.S.C. 1144(b)(4)-(8) (1998). These exceptions deal with generally applicable state
criminal law; the Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act; some multiple employee welfare arrangements,
as defined in ERISA § 3(40XA), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(40XA) (1998); qualified domestic relations
orders, as defined by ERISA § 206(dX3)(BXi), 29 U.S.C. 1056(d)(3)(B)(i) (1998); qualified medical
child support orders, as defined by ERISA § 609(aX2XA), 29 U.S.C. § 1169(a)(2)(A) (1998); and
other ERISA provisions. Moreover, ERISA does not preempt or supersede other federal laws.
ERISA § 514(d), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (1998).
23. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust and Say. Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 99, 114 S.
Ct. 517, 526 (1993) (citing Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedcaux, 481 U.S. 41, 46, 107 S. Ct. 1549, 1552
(1993) and Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739, 105 S. Ct. 2380, 2389
(1985)).
24. FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 58, 111 S. Ct. 403, 407 (1990).
25. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514
U.S. 645, 653-54, 115 S. Ct. 1671, 1676 (1995).
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scope," 6 and an "expansive sweep."'2 Because of its intended expansive
coverage, the boundaries of ERISA's preemptive reach have been the focus of
considerable jurisprudential attention since the Supreme Court first addressed the
issue in 1981. In fact, the Court has decided no less than sixteen ERISA
preemption cases in the last seventeen years.2" According to the Court, the high
number of ERISA preemption cases29 reflects the complex and comprehensive
nature of the statute, the prevalence of pension and welfare plans in the national
economy, and their importance to the financial security of the American
workforce. 30
Most of the Supreme Court cases involve the proper scope of the "relate to"
clause of the preemption provision, and the Court has struggled, particularly in its
more recent decisions, with the inherent vagueness of that key statutory phrase.
Some ERISA cases involve the question of conflict preemption-whether a state
law is preempted because it conflicts with a specific portion of the ERISA statute.
This article will survey and examine the sixteen ERISA preemption Supreme
Court cases and attempt to identify evolving analyses and trends.
II. EARLY SUPREME COURT CASES: 1981-1992
The Court first construed ERISA's preemption provision in Alessi v.
Raybestos-Manhatten, Inc." Defendants, two New Jersey employers, main-
tained ERISA covered pension plans. Both plans provided that an employee's
retirement benefits would be offset or reduced by an amount equal to state
workers' compensation awards. In 1977, the New Jersey Legislature amended
26. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 739, 105 S. Ct. at 2388-89.
27. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 47, 107 S. Ct. at 1552-53.
28. De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Serv. Fund, 117 S. Ct. 1747. 1754 n.1 (1997)
(citing Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997); California Div. of Labor Standards
Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr. N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 117 S. CL 832 (1997); New York State
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 115 S. Ct. 1671
(1995); John Hancock Mut, Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust and Say. Bank, 510 U.S. 86. 114 S. Ct. 517
(1993); District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 113 S. Ct. 580
(1992); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, Ill S. Ct. 478 (1990); FMC Corp. v.
Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 111 S. Ct. 403 (1990); Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 109 S. Ct.
1668 (1989); Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 108 S. Ct. 2182
(1988); Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 107 S. Ct. 2211 (1987); Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 107 S. Ct. 1542 (1987); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S.
41, 107 S. Ct. 1549 (1987); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 105 S. Ct.
2380 (1985); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 103 S. Ct. 2890 (1983); and Alessi v.
Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 101 S. Ct. 1895 (1981)).
29. In 1992, there were already over 2,800 judicial opinions addressing ERISA preemption.
See District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 135 n.3, 113 S. Ct. 580, 586
n.3 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting). A recent Westlaw search revealed an additional 1,527 ERISA
preemption opinions since 1992.
30. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. at 1760.
31. 451 U.S. 504, 101 S. Ct. 1895 (1981).
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its workers' compensation laws to expressly prohibit such pension plan offsets."
Alleging violations of the state law, two suits were initiated in New Jersey state
court. In both suits, plaintiffs were retired employees whose pension plan
retirement benefits had been offset or reduced by their workers' compensation
awards. The defendant companies removed the suits to federal court. There,
both district court judges ruled that the pension offset provisions were invalid
under New Jersey law,3 and concluded that Congress had not intended ERISA
to preempt laws of this sort.34 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals consolidated
the cases and reversed,"3 finding, among other things, that the New Jersey
statute forbidding offsets of pension benefits by the amount of workers'
compensation awards could not withstand ERISA's generalpreemption provision.
After granting certiorari, a unanimous Supreme Court began its analysis by
first acknowledging that, in enacting ERISA's preemption provision, Congress
intended to depart from its previous legislation that envisioned the exercise of
state regulation over pension funds and meant to establish pension plan regulation
as an exclusive federal concern.36 The Court then noted that the ERISA
preemption phrase "'relate[s] to any employee benefit plan' . . . gives rise to
some confusion" where it is asserted to apply to a state law governing an area
subject to the state's traditional police power, e.g., workers' compensation.37
Although acknowledging some "confusion," the Court did not analyze the
language of the preemption provision. Rather, it struck down the statute because
the practice of offsetting pension benefits was permissible under federal law and
the law of other states. Allowing the state statute to stand would have forced the
employer to either structure all its benefit payments in accordance with New
Jersey law or to adopt different payment formulae for employees inside and
outside the state. Under those circumstances, the employer would be required
to accommodate conflicting regulatory schemes in devising and operating a
system for processing and paying benefits claims-precisely the burden ERISA
preemption intended to avoid.3s The Alessi Court rejected New Jersey's claim
that the state attempted to protect workers' compensation benefits, not regulate
benefit plans. The Court maintained that ERISA's definition of a "state" as that
"which purports to regulate directly or indirectly ... employee benefit plans"
made clear that even inadvertent state action bearing on private pension plans
may encroach upon the area of exclusive federal concern.39
32. Id. at 507-08, 101 S. Ct. at 1898. The New Jersey law at issue stated that "[tihe right of
compensation granted by this chapter may be set off against disability pension benefits or payments
but shall not be set off against employees' retirement pension benefits or payments." N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 34:15-29 (West Supp. 1980).
33. 464 F. Supp. 133 (D.N.J. 1978); 456 F. Supp. 867 (D.N.J. 1978).
34. Alessi, 451 U.S. at 508, 101 S. Ct. at 1898-99.
35. Buczynski v. General Motors Corp., 616 F.2d 1238 (3d Cir. 1980).
36. Alessi, 451 U.S. at 523, 101 S. Ct. at 1906.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 524-25, 101 S. Ct. at 1907.
39. Id.
1002 [Vol. 58
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Although the Supreme Court did not address the meaning of the "relate to"
phrase in Alessi, it confronted the subject again two years later in Shaw v. Delta
Airlines, Inc.' At issue was whether two New York laws--one prohibiting
discrimination in employee benefit plans based on pregnancy" and the other
requiring employers to pay sick-leave benefits to employees unable to work
because of pregnancy2-were preempted by ERISA.'3 Delta Airlines and two
other employers provided their employees with various ERISA-covered medical
and disability benefit plans. These plans did not, however, provide benefits to
employees disabled by pregnancy as required by the two New York laws." As
a result, the three employers brought declaratory judgment actions against state
agencies and officials alleging the laws were preempted by ERISA."
In a unanimous opinion, the Court analyzed whether the two laws "relate[d]
to" an ERISA plan. Citing Black's Law Dictionary's definition of the term
"relate," the Court held that a law relates to an employee benefit plan, in the
normal sense of the phrase, "if it has a connection with or reference to" such a
plan.' Employing this definition, the Court held that the Human Rights Law,
which prohibited employers from structuring their employee benefit plans in a
manner that discriminated on the basis of pregnancy, and the Disability Benefits
Law, which required employers to pay employees specific benefits, clearly
"relate[d] to" benefit plans.' The Court held that the plain language of the
preemption provision, the structure of ERISA, s and its legislative history, all
supported such a finding. 9 The Court did, however, temper its broad "refer-
ence to or connection with" analysis, conceding "some state actions may affect
employee benefit plans in too tenuous, remote or peripheral a manner to warrant
a finding that the law 'relates to' the plan."' 0
The Court then considered the State's argument that the Human Rights Law
was exempt from preemption under ERISA section 514(d)," which states the
preemption provision shall not "be construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate,
impair, or supersede any law of the United States. . . ." Relying on this
40. 463 U.S. 85, 103 S. Ct. 2890 (1983).
41. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296.1(a) (McKinney 1982).
42. N.Y. Work. Comp. Law § 205.3 (McKinney 1977).
43. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 88, 103 S. Ct. at 2895.
44. The two New York laws were enacted prior to the addition of the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act of 1978 to Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1976 ed., Supp. V).
45. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 92, 103 S. Ct. at 2897.
46. Id. at 97, 103 S. Ct. at 2900 n.16.
47. Id.
48. In determining that ERISA's structure supported a broad reading of the preemption
provision, the Court observed that if Congress intended to preempt only state laws specifically
designed to affect employee benefit plans, it would have been unnecessary to exempt generally
applicable state criminal statutes from preemption. Id.
49. Id. at 100, 103 S. Ct at 2901.
50. Id. at 100 n.21, 103 5. Ct. 2901.
51. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (1998).
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exception, the State asserted that preemption of the Human Rights Law would
impair and modify Title VII because it would change the means by which Title
VII was enforced.5 2 Agreeing with the State, the Court observed that Title VII
expressly preserved non-conflicting state laws." Further, the Court noted that
when an employment practice prohibited by Title VII occurs in a state that
prohibits the same practice, and the state has established an agency to enforce
that prohibition, the EEOC refers the charge to the state agency for a determina-
tion.54 Given the interplay between federal and state employment laws, the
Court reasoned:
If ERISA were interpreted to pre-empt the Human Rights Law entirely
with respect to covered benefit plans, the State no longer could prohibit
the challenged employment practice and the state agency no longer
would be authorized to grant relief. The EEOC thus would be unable
to refer the claim to the state agency. This would frustrate the goal of
encouraging joint state/federal enforcement of Title VII; an employee's
only remedies for discrimination prohibited by Title VII in ERISA plans
would be federal ones. Such a disruption of the enforcement scheme
contemplated by Title VII would, in the words of § 514(d), "modify"
and "impair" federal law.5"
The Court also noted Title VII was neutral on the subject of employment
practices it did not prohibit. As such, the Court found that insofar as state laws
prohibit employment practices that are lawful under Title VII, preemption would
not "impair" Title VII within the meaning of Section 514(d). Accordingly, the
Court held that the Human Rights Law was preempted with respect to ERISA
benefit plans only to the extent that it prohibited practices that were lawful under
federal law. 6
The Court next focused on the Disability Benefits Law. Although the Court
held that the disability law "related to" an ERISA plan, it noted that
section 514(a) of ERISA limited preemption to state laws that related to
benefit plans "described in section 4(a)" and not exempt under section
52. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 100-01, 103 S. Ct. at 2902.
53. Id. at 101,103 S. Ct. at 2902. Section 708 of Title VII provides "Nothing in this title shall
be deemed to exempt or relieve any person from any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided
by any present or future law of any State or political subdivision of a State, other than any such law
which purports to require or permit the doing of any act which would be an unlawful employment
practice under this title." See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1996).
54. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 101, 103 S. Ct. at 2902. The EEOC may not actively process any
charges "before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State
or local law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1989).
55. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 102, 103 S. Ct. at 2902-03.
56. Id. at 103, 103 S. Ct. at 2903.
57. ERISA § 4(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (1998), provides that the provisions of ERISA "shall
apply to any employee benefit plan if it is established or maintained-(I) by any employer engaged
in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce; or (2) by any employee organization
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4(b)."'s Section 4(b)(3) exempts any employee benefit plan "maintained solely
for the purpose of complying with applicable ... disability insurance laws." 9
Consequently, the Disability Benefits Law would not be preempted if the plans
to which it related were exempt from ERISA under Section 4(b).
Answering that question, the Court recognized that Section 4(b)(3) excludes
"plans," not portions of plans, from ERISA coverage. As such, the Court found
that those portions of the employers' multi-benefit plans maintained to comply
with the Disability Benefits Law were covered by ERISA and because of
preemption could not be regulated by state law:
There is no reason to believe that Congress used the word "plan" in §
4(b) to refer to individual benefits offered by an employee benefit plan.
To the contrary, § 4(b)(3)'s use of the word "solely" demonstrates that
the purpose of the entire plan must be to comply with an applicable
disability insurance law.60
The Court further observed:
The test is not one of the employer's motive-any employer could
claim that it provided disability benefits altruistically, to attract good
employees, or to increase employee productivity, as well as to obey
state law-but whether the plan, as an administrative unit, provides only
those benefits required by the applicable state law.6'
Accordingly, the Court found that while a state may not require an employer
to alter its ERISA plan, it may force the employer to choose between providing
disability benefits in a separately administered plan and including the state-
mandated benefits in its ERISA plan. "If the State is not satisfied that the
ERISA plan comports with the requirements of its disability insurance law, it
may compel the employer to maintain a separate plan that does comply."6
Ultimately, although the Court held that the Disability Benefits Law was not
preempted, the State of New York could not enforce its provisions through
regulation of ERISA-covered benefits plans.6"
Two years later, the Court decided Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v.
Massachusetts.64 In another unanimous opinion, the Court addressed, for the
first time, ERISA's "saving" clause which exempts from preemption state laws
or organizations representing employees engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting
commerce; or (3) by both."
58. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1998).
59. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(bX3) (1998).
60. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 107, 103 S. Ct. at 2905.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 108, 103 S. Ct. at 2906.
63. Id. at 109, 103 S. Ct. at 2906.
64. 471 U.S. 724, 105 S. Ct. 2380 (1985).
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"which regulate insurance, banking, and securities., 65 The Court considered the
impact of ERISA preemption on a Massachusetts statute requiring certain
minimum mental health care benefits be provided to Massachusetts residents
insured under a general health policy or an employee health care plan."
Following enactment of the statute, the Attorney General of Massachusetts filed
a declaratory judgment action against certain insurers who failed to amend their
insurance policies in compliance with the statute. 7 Eventually, the case made
its way to the Supreme Court.6"
At the outset, the Court held the statute related to an ERISA plan, thus
placing it within the broad sweep of the preemption clause because it bore
"indirectly but substantially" on all insured benefit plans by requiring the plans
to purchase the benefits specified in the statute.69 The Court then turned to the
state's argument that the statute was "saved" from preemption because it was a
state law regulating insurance.
Beginning its analysis, the Court observed that, "while clear enough on their
faces," the preemption and saving clauses are not models of legislative drafting,
"for while the general pre-emption clause broadly pre-empts state law, the
savings clause appears broadly to preserve States' lawmaking power over much
of the same regulation."7 Notwithstanding this "statutory complexity," the
Court maintained that, on its face, the statute was saved from preemption as a
law "which regulates insurance" within the meaning of the saving clause because
it regulated the terms of certain insurance contracts. 71
The Court's "common-sense" view of the statute was reinforced by the
language of the "deemer clause," which states an employee benefit plan shall not
be deemed to be an insurance company "for purposes of any law of any State
purporting to regulate insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust
companies, or investment companies."" The Court found that by excluding
from the saving clause laws regulating insurance contracts applying directly to
benefit plans, the deemer clause demonstrated Congress' intent to include laws
that regulate insurance contracts within the scope of the insurance laws preserved
by the saving clause."
As part of its analysis, the Court rejected the insurers' argument that
mandated-benefit laws are not traditional insurance laws. In support of this
finding, the Court adopted the criteria of the McCarran-Ferguson Act 74 to
65. ERISA § 514(b)(2XA), 29 U.S.C. § i144(bX2XA) (1998).
66. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 727, 105 S. Ct. at 2382-83.
67. Id. at 734, 105 S. Ct. at 2386.
68. The lower court decisions are reported at Attorney Gen. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 385 Mass.
598, 433 N.E.2d 1223 (1982) and 391 Mass. 730, 463 N.E.2d 548 (1984).
69. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 739, 105 S. Ct. at 2388-89.
70. Id. at 739-40, 105 S. Ct. at 2389.
71. Id.
72. Id. (citing ERISA § 514(bX2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1998)) (emphasis added).
73. Id. at 741, 105 S. Ct. 2389-90.
74. 15 U.S.C. § 1011-1015 (1984 & Supp. 1998). Congress' "primary concern" in enacting
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determine whether regulation regarding the substantive terms of insurance
contracts fell squarely within the saving clause as laws "which regulate
insurance." Those criteria were summarized as: (1) whether the practice has the
effect of spreading risk among all insureds; (2) whether the practice is an integral
part of the policy relationship between the insurer and the insured; and (3)
whether the practice is limited to entities within the insurance industry."
Initially, the Court determined the statute regulated the spreading of risk
because its intent was to effectuate legislative judgment that the risk of mental
health care should be shared. Next, the Court found that mandated-benefit laws
directly regulated an integral part of the relationship between the insurer and the
policyholder by limiting the type of insurance that an insurer may sell to the
policyholder. The Court. also reasoned that the third McCarran-Ferguson
criterion was present because mandated-benefit statutes imposed requirements
only on insurers, with the intent of affecting the relationship between the insurer
and the policyholder.76 Concluding its analysis, the Court stated:
In short, the plain language of the saving clause, its relationship to the
other ERISA pre-emption provisions, and the traditional understanding
of insurance regulation, all lead us to the conclusion that mandated-
benefit laws such as § 47B are saved from pre-emption by the operation
of the saving clause.
The decision, the Court acknowledged, "result[ed] in a distinction between
insured and uninsured plans, leaving the former open to indirect regulation while
the latter are not."'  However, the Court maintained that "[b]y so doing, we
merely give life to a distinction created by Congress in the 'deemer clause,' a
distinction Congress is aware of and one it has chosen not to alter."79
McCarran-Ferguson was to "ensure that the States would continue to have the ability to tax and
regulate the business of insurance." Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co.. 440 U.S. 205,
217-18, 99 S. Ct. 1067, 1076 (1979). The Act provides that."The business of insurance, and every
person engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the
regulation ... of such business." 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a) (1984 & Supp. 1998). According to the
Metropolitan Life Court, "The ERISA saving clause, with its similarly worded protection of 'any law
of any State which regulates insurance,' appears to have been designed to preserve the McCarran-
Ferguson Act's reservation of the business of insurance to the States. The saving clause and the
McCarran-Ferguson Act serve the same federal policy and utilize similar language to define what is
left to the States." 417 U.S. at 744 n.2l, 105 S. Ct. at 2391 n.21.
75. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 742-43, 105 S. Ct. at 2390-91.
76. Id. at 743, 105 S. Ct. at 2391.
77. Id. at 744, 105 S. Ct. at 2391. The Court also pointed out that Massachusetts had never
tried to enforce that portion of the statute pertaining directly to benefit plans, effectively conceding
that such an application of the statute would be preempted by ERISA's preemption clause. id. at
735, 105 S. Ct. at 2387 n.14.
78. Id. at 747, 105 S. Ct. at 2393.
79. Id.
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Two terms later, the Court again construed the insurance saving clause and
the "relate to" clause in Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux.s° There, plaintiff
filed a diversity action in a Mississippi federal court challenging the termination
of his disability benefits and asserting state law claims for tortious breach of
contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraud in the inducement. Plaintiffs suit
sought state law damages for failure to provide benefits under an insurance
policy, general damages for mental and emotional distress, and punitive and
exemplary damages. Plaintiff did not, however, assert any of the several causes
of action available to him under ERISA.8' Eventually, defendant filed a motion
for summary judgment asserting the plaintiff's claims were preempted. The
district court granted defendant's summary judgment, but the Fifth Circuit
reversed,82 relying on Metropolitan Life).
3
In its fourth consecutive unanimous preemption opinion, the Court held that
because each state law claim was based on the alleged improper processing of
a claim for benefits under an employee benefit plan, those claims indisputably
related to an ERISA plan and thus were preempted."4 The Court then addressed
the plaintiff's assertion that because the Mississippi law of bad faith (part of his
tortious breach of contract claim) regulated insurers such as the defendant, it was
saved from preemption. The Court observed that a common-sense understanding
of the phrase "regulates insurance" meant that a law must not simply have an
impact on the insurance industry, but "must be specifically directed toward that
industry."'" Because the roots of the law of bad faith were firmly planted in
the general principles of tort and contract law, and not limited to breach of an
insurance contract, the Court determined the law did not regulate insurance
within the meaning of the saving clause.8
The Court also rejected the assertion that the law of bad faith met any of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act criteria. In contrast to the mandated-benefits law in
Metropolitan Life, 7 the common law of bad faith did not define the terms of
the relationship between the insurer and the insured. Rather, it declared only
that, whatever terms were agreed Ulion in the insurance contract, a breach of that
contract may, in certain circumstances, allow the policyholder to obtain punitive
damages. Thus, the state common law of bad faith was therefore no more
"integral" to the insurer-insured relationship than any state's general contract law
was integral to a contract made in that state. 88
80. 481 U.S. 41, 107 S. Ct. 1549 (1987).
81. Id. at 43-44, 107 S. Ct. at 1551.
82. 770 F.2d 1311 (5th Cir. 1985).
83. 471 U.S. 724, 105 S. Ct. 2380 (1985), supra notes 65-80 and accompanying text.
84. 481 U.S. at 47-48, 107 S. Ct. at 1553.
85. Id. at 50, 107 S. Ct. at 1554.
86. Id.
87. 471 U.S. 724, 105 S. Ct. 2380 (1985), supra notes 65-80 and accompanying text.
88. 481 U.S. at 51, 107 S. Ct. at 1555.
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Finally, the Court reasoned that Congress clearly expressed an intent that the
civil enforcement provisions of ERISA' 9 be the exclusive vehicle for actions
asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits, and that varying state
causes of action for claims within the scope of Section 502(a) would pose an
obstacle to the purposes and objectives of Congress. Accordingly, because of
"the deliberate care with which ERISA's civil enforcement remedies were drafted
and the balancing of policies embodied in its choice of remedies," the Court
concluded that plaintiff's state common law claims were preempted.90
The same day the Court decided Pilot Life it issued its opinion in Metropoli-
tan Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor ("Taylor").9" There, the Court held that a state
court suit that did not raise a federal claim within the four comers of the petition
was removable to federal court.9" Taylor arose out of a suit filed in Michigan
state court by an employee against his employer and the insurer of the
employer's benefit plan for "compensatory damages for money contractually
owed Plaintiff, compensation for mental anguish caused by breach of [his
insurance] contract, as well as immediate re-implementation of all benefits and
insurance coverages ... .3 Plaintiff also asserted claims for wrongful
termination of his employment and for wrongfully failing to promote him in
retaliation for a prior workers' compensation claim. None of the claims raised
by the plaintiff's state lawsuit, however, referred to ERISA or raised any other
federal claims. Thus, pursuant to the "well-pleaded complaint" rule, the
plaintiff's suit was not removable to federal court. 9 Nonetheless, the defen-
89. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1998). Under the civil enforcement provisions of Section
502(a), a plan participant or beneficiary may sue to recover benefits due under the plan, to enforce
the participant's rights under the plan, or to clarify rights to future benefits. Relief may take the form
of accrued benefits due, a declaratory judgment on entitlement to benefits, or an injunction against
a plan administrator's improper refusal to pay benefits. A participant or beneficiary may also bring
a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, and under this cause of action may seek removal of
the fiduciary.
90. 481 U.S. at 52-54, 107 S. Ct. at 1555-57.
91. 481 U.S. 58, 107 S. Ct. 1542 (1987).
92. 481 U.S. at 60, 107 S. Ct. at 1544. By statute "any civil action brought in a State court
of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the
defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division
embracing the place where such action is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1998). One category of
cases over which the district courts have original jurisdiction are "federal question" cases; that is,
those cases "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(1986).
93. 418 U.S. at 61, 107 S. Ct. at 1545.
94. The well-pleaded complaint rule has been called "the basic principle marking the
boundaries of the federal question jurisdiction of the federal district courts." Franchise Tax Bd. of
Ca. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Ca., 463 U.S. 1, 9-12, 103 S. Ct. 2841, 2846-48
(1983). The rule was first set forth in Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149,
152, 29 S. Ct. 42, 43 (1908), and provides that a cause of action arises under federal law only when
issues of federal law appear on the face of the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint. Thus, in Franchise
Tax Bd., an ERISA preemption/removal case, the Court held that a case may not be removed to
federal court on the basis of a federal defense, including the defense of preemption, even if the
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dants removed the suit to federal court alleging federal question jurisdiction over
the benefits claim by virtue of ERISA and pendent jurisdiction over the
remaining claims. The District Court found the case properly removable and
eventually granted the defendants' summary judgment on the merits.95 The
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the District Court
lacked removal jurisdiction." The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Supreme Court first held that under Pilot Life plaintiff's common law
contract and tort claims "relate[d]" to a benefit plan and thus were preempted by
ERISA. The Court also held the claims were not "saved" from preemption
because the state claims were based upon common law, not laws regulating
insurance. 97 The Court observed that because this was a suit by a beneficiary
to recover benefits from an ERISA plan, the claim fell squarely under Section
502(a)(l)(B) of ERISA, the exclusive federal cause of action for resolution of
such disputes.9
Turning to the removal issue, the Court explained that, under the "well-
pleaded complaint rule," a cause of action arises under federal law only when the
plaintiff's complaint raises issues of federal law within the four comers of the
petition. The Court noted, however, that legislatively, Congress may so
completely preempt a particular area, that any civil complaint, even one not
citing federal law in the four comers of the petition, is removable because it is
necessarily federal in character.9
The Court cited Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act,' °°
which provides that, "[s]uits for violation of contracts between and employer and
a labor organization ... may be brought in any district court in the United States
having jurisdiction over the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy
or without regard to the citizenship of the parties." Similarly, the jurisdiction
clause of Section 502 of ERISA provides: "The district courts of the United
States shall have jurisdiction, without respect to the amount in controversy or the
citizenship of the parties, to grant the relief provided for in subsection (a) of this
section in any action."' 0 ' Relying on the close parallels between the two
jurisdictional statutes, the Court concluded, "Congress has clearly manifested an
defense is anticipated in the plaintifrs complaint, and even if both parties admit that the defense is
the only question truly at issue in the case. Id. at 14, 103 S. Ct. at 2848.
95. 588 F. Supp. 562 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
96. Taylor, 481 U.S. at 61-62, 107 S. Ct. at 1545 (citing Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 763
F.2d 216 (6th Cir. 1985)).
97. Id. at 62, 107 S. CL at 1546.
98. Id. at 62-63, 107 S. Ct. at 1546.
99. Id. at 63-64, 107 S. Ct. at 1546. (citing Avco Corp. v. Machinist, 390 U.S. 557, 88 S. Ct.
1235 (1968) (other citations omitted)). Avco stands for the proposition that if a federal cause of
action completely preempts a state cause of action, any complaint that comes within the scope of the
federal cause of action necessarily "arises under" federal law. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 23-24,
103 S. Ct. at 2854.
100. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1993).
101. 29 U.S.C. § I I32(f) (1998).
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intent to make causes of action within the scope of the civil enforcement
provisions of § 502(a) removable to federal court."' 02  As such the Taylor
petition, although purporting to raise only state law claims, was "federal in
character" and removable to federal court.' 0'
The Court's third 1987 preemption case was Fort Halifax Packing Co. v.
Coyne.'° This case was far more difficult for the Court to resolve than its
predecessors, as reflected by the five-to-four decision, representing the first time
the Court split on an ERISA preemption case. At issue was a Maine statute
requiring employers with more than one hundred employees to provide a one-
time severance payment to employees in the event of a plant closing.' 5o After
the employer closed its plant and declined to pay severance benefits, employees
and the Maine Director of the Bureau of Labor Standards filed suit against the
employer. The employer argued the Maine statute was preempted because
severance benefits are covered by ERISA' ° and any state law pertaining to a
type of employee benefit listed in ERISA necessarily regulates an employee
benefit plan.'07
Rejecting the employer's contentions, the majority explained that ERISA's
preemption provision does not refer to state laws relating to "employee benefits,"
but rather to state laws relating to "employee benefit plans."'08 Although the
Court acknowledged that it had previously construed the phrase "relate to"
expansively, it maintained: "Nothing in our case law, however, supports
appellant's position that the word 'plan' should in effect be read out of the
statute."'" The Court then noted that, under the statute, the employer assumed
no responsibility to pay benefits on a regular basis, and thus faced no periodic
demands on its assets that created a need for financial coordination and control.
Rather, the employer's obligation was predicated on the occurrence of a single
contingency that might never materialize. However, even to the extent that the
obligation to make the severance payment did arise, satisfaction of that duty
involved only one payment to employees at the time of plant closure." 0
102. Taylor, 481 U.S. at 66, 107 S. CL at 1548. The Court also recognized that in its prior
decision in Franchise Tax Bd., it suggested that a state action that was not only preempted by
ERISA, but also came within the scope of ERISA's civil enforcement section (Section 502(a)), might
fall within the ,vco rule. Id. at 64, 107 S. Ct. at 1547.
103. 481 U.S. at 67, 107 S. Ct. at 1548. The concurring opinion by Justices Brennan and
Marshall stressed the narrow nature of the Court's holding, emphasizing that the decision should not
be interpreted as adopting a broad rule that any defense premised on congressional intent to preempt
state law is sufficient to establish removal jurisdiction. Id. at 68, 107 S. Ct. at 1548.
104. 482 U.S. 1, 107 S. CL 2211 (1987).
105. Me. Rev. Stal. Ann., tit. 26 § 625-B (West Supp. 1986-1987).
106. 29 U.S.C. §1002(i)(B) (1998).
107. 482 U.S. at 7, 107 S. Ct. at 2215.
108. Id. at 8, 107 S. Ct. at 2215 ("[Tjhe provisions of this subchapter... shall supersede any
and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan ......
29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1998) (emphasis added)).
109. Id. at 8, 107 S. Ct. at 2216 (citations omitted).
I10. Id. at 12, 107 S. Ct. at 2218.
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The Court also held preemption of the Maine statute was inconsistent with
congressional intent. The Court noted that in enacting ERISA, Congress was
concerned with uniform federal regulation of employee benefit plans because
such plans involved the ongoing administrative activity potentially subject to
employer abuse. The Maine statute's requirement of a one-time lump-sum
payment, triggered by a single event, required no on-going administrative scheme
to meet the employer's obligation. As such, the Maine statute did not create the
type activity subject to employer abuse that ERISA was designed to prevent and
therefore was not preempted."
The dissent criticized the majority for creating a loophole in ERISA's
preemption statute by making preemption turn on the existence of an "adminis-
trative scheme"'2 and argued that requiring an administrative scheme as a
prerequisite for ERISA preemption effectively allowed states to dictate a wide
array of employee benefits to be provided by employers by simply characterizing
them as "non-administrative." Such a requirement would in turn allow states to
circumvent the intent of Congress to preempt all state laws that relate to
employee benefit plans."'
The following term, the Court decided Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency
& Service. 14 There, a collection agency filed suit in state district court,
obtained judgments against twenty-three welfare benefit plan participants, and
then successfully instituted an action garnishing the participants' welfare plan
benefits.' The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed,"' holding that a Geor-
gia statute, barring the garnishment of funds or benefits of an employee benefit
plan or program subject to ERISA, exempted plan benefits from garnish-
ment." 7 Reversing the appellate court, the Georgia Supreme Court stated that
while it agreed with the appellate court that the statute barred the garnishment
action, the statute was preempted by ERISA because it purported to regulate
garnishment of ERISA funds and benefits."' The Georgia Supreme Court
concluded that Congress did not bar garnishment of employee welfare benefits,
even though employee pension benefits were protected by ERISA as non-
alienable." 9 Because the statute prohibited that which ERISA permitted, the
Georgia Supreme Court held the statute was "in conflict with" the federal
scheme, and therefore preempted. By the same token, however, the Georgia
Ill. Id. at 16,107 S. Ct. at 2220.
112. Id. at 23, 107 S. Ct. at 2223-24.
113. Id. at 23-25, 107 S. Ct. at 2224-25.
114. 486 U.S. 825, 108 S. Ct. 2182 (1988).
115. The Georgia statute at issue barred the garnishment of "[fOunds or benefits of [an] ...
employee benefit plan or program subject to ... [ERISA]." Ga. Code Ann. § 18-4-22.1 (1982).
116. 178 Ga. App. 467, 343 S.E.2d 492 (1986).
117. 486 U.S. at 827-88, 108 S. Ct. at 2184-25.
118. 256 Ga. 499, 350 S.E.2d 439 (1986).
119. Under ERISA § 206(dXI), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1998), "Each pension plan shall
provide that benefits provided under [an ERISA plan] may not be assigned or alienated." No such
protection exists under ERISA for welfare benefits.
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Supreme Court concluded that the plan was subject to garnishment under the
general state garnishment law.20
Citing conflicting decisions among the courts on this issue, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari. In a five-to-four opinion, the Court conceded at the
outset that the Georgia statute in dispute related to an ERISA plan and was
preempted because it expressly referred to-indeed, solely applied to-ERISA
employee benefit plans.'2' The Court then addressed what it considered "the
more complex question" of whether the entire Georgia garnishment procedure,
which did not single out or refer to ERISA plans in any way, was preempted by
ERISA.' 22
The Court rejected the argument of the plan's trustees that garnishment
imposed administrative costs and burdens upon benefit plans. Rather, the Court
concluded, the text and structure of ERISA's preemption and enforcement
provisions demonstrated that "Congress did not intend to forbid the use of state-
law mechanisms of executing judgments against ERISA welfare benefit plans,
even when those mechanisms prevent plan participants from receiving their
benefits."' 123 In reaching its conclusion that Georgia's general garnishment
statutes were not preempted, the Court relied on two principal arguments.
First, the Court noted Congress contemplated that ERISA benefit plans could
be sued under certain circumstances, i.e., pursuant to ERISA section
502(d)(2),'2 4 the civil enforcement statute, and for "run-of-the-mill state-law
claims" such as unpaid rent, failure to pay creditors, or torts committed by an
ERISA plan. 2' Because ERISA does not provide an enforcement mechanism
for collecting judgments won in such suits, the Court reasoned that
Congress must have intended that state law methods of collection remain
undisturbed. 6
The Court's second argument focused on congressional intent. The Court
held that when Congress intended to preclude a particular method of state-law
enforcement of judgments, or extend anti-alienation protection to a particular
type of ERISA plan, it did so expressly. Citing ERISA section 206(d)(1),"'
barring the alienation or assignment of pension benefits provided for by ERISA
benefit plans, the Court observed Congress did not enact any similar provision
applicable to ERISA welfare benefit plans such as the one at issue in Mackey.
The Court maintained that Congress' silence concerning the attachment or
garnishment of ERISA welfare plan benefits "acknowledged and accepted the
120. 486 U.S. at 828, 108 S. Ct. at 2185.
121. Id. at 829.30, 108 S. Ct. at 2185-86.
122. Id. at 830-31, 108 S. Ct. at 2186.
123. Id. at 831-32, 108 S. Ct. at 2186.
124. 29 U.S.C. § I I32(dX2) (1998).
125. 486 U.S. at 832-33, 108 S. Ct. at 2186-87.
126. Id. at 833-34, 108 S. Ct. at 2187-88.
127. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1998).
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practice, rather than prohibit[ed] it."' 28 Accordingly, the majority concluded
that ERISA preemption fell short of barring application of a general state
garnishment statute to participants' benefits in the hands of an ERISA welfare
benefit plan.
Four members of the Court dissented. The thrust of the dissent was the
majority's failure to recognize the "substantial and onerous obligation" state
garnishment laws would impose on employee benefit plans. For instance, the
plan at issue would incur significant administrative burdens and costs to confirm
the identity of each of the twenty-three plan participants in debt to the collection
agency, calculate the participant's maximum entitlement from the fund for the
period between the service date and the reply date of the summons of garnish-
ment, determine the amount that each participant owed to respondent, and make
payments into state court of the lesser of the amount owed to the collection
agency and the participant's entitlement. The plan trustees would also be
required to determine the validity and priority of garnishments and, if necessary,
bear the costs of litigating these issues. Further, because the plan was a multi-
employer plan with participants in several states, it was potentially subject to
multiple garnishment orders under varying or conflicting state laws.1'2 9
Arguing these effects of garnishment laws on employee benefit plans were not
too tenuous, remote, or peripheral, the dissent asserted that such laws should be
preempted.'30
The Court's next ERISA preemption case, Massachusetts v. Morash,"' was
another unanimous opinion. There, an employer was charged with criminal
violation of a Massachusetts payment of wages statute for failing to pay unused
vacation time to discharged employees." 2 The employer moved to dismiss the
charges on the ground that its vacation policy, paid out of general assets, was an
"employee welfare benefit plan" under ERISA and that the state law prosecution
was therefore preempted. 33 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve
a split in the circuits on the issue of whether vacation pay benefits, paid from an
employer's general assets, constituted a welfare benefit plan governed by
ERISA.' 3'
The Court recognized that although the definition of "welfare benefit plan"
included "any plan, fund, or program ... maintained for the purpose of
providing ... vacation benefits,""' neither "plan, fund, or program" nor
128. 486 U.S. at 837-38,108 S. Ct. at 2189-90 (citing Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451
U.S. 504, 516, 101 S. Ct. 1895, 1902 (1981)).
129. Id. at 842, 108 S. Ct. at 2192.
I30. Id. (citing Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. at 100 n.21, 103 S. Ct. at 2901 n.21).
131. 490 U.S. 107, 109 S. Ct. 1668 (1989).
132. Under the Massachusetts law at issue, an employer was required to pay a discharged
employee his full wages, including holiday or vacation payments, on the date of discharge. Mass.
Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148 (1987).
133. 490 U.S. at 109-11, 109 S. CL at 1670-71.
134. Id. at 112, 109 S. Ct. at 1671.
135. ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1998).
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"vacation benefits" was further defined. Nonetheless, the Court noted that
Congress' primary goal in enacting ERISA was to prevent mismanagement of
funds accumulated to finance employee benefits by establishing extensive
reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary duty requirements. The Court held that
because ordinary vacation payments are typically fixed, due at known times, and
do not depend on contingencies outside the employee's control, payment of such
benefits presented none of the risks ERISA was intended to address.
1 6
The Court also held that inclusion of routine vacation pay policies within
ERISA would result in profound consequences for employers, courts, and
employees. For example, ERISA coverage for routine vacation pay would
require employers providing such benefits either to comply with ERISA's
detailed reporting and disclosure requirements, or to discontinue the practice of
compensating employees for unused vacation time. Additionally, if ERISA
covered claims for vacation benefits, federal court jurisdiction would expand
greatly, providing any employee with a vacation grievance a federal forum.
Finally, because ERISA's vesting and funding requirements did not apply to
welfare benefit plans,'" employees participating in vacation plans would
receive less statutory protection if ERISA displaced existing extensive state
regulation of vesting, funding, and participation rights for such bene-
fits."' For these reasons, the Court held that payments for unused
vacation time to' discharged employees by a single employer from its
general assets did not constitute an ERISA plan and therefore were not
preempted by ERISA.
39
In its next case, FMC Corp. v. Holliday, '4 the Court again interpreted the
saving and deemer clauses in deciding whether ERISA preempted a Pennsylvania
anti-subrogation law, as applied to a self-funded welfare benefit plan. A plan
beneficiary was involved in an automobile accident requiring extensive medical
treatment paid for by the plan. The plan contained a clause requiring reimburse-
ment of benefits if the participant recovered on a claim against a third party. 4'
The plan was self-funded, i.e., it did not purchase an insurance policy from any
insurance company in order to satisfy its obligations to its participants.' 2
After paying benefits, the plan asserted its subrogation right with respect to
proceeds from the tort litigation.' 3 The beneficiary refused to reimburse the
136. 490 U.S. at 115, 109 S. Ct. at 1673.
137. ERISA §§ 201(I), 301(a),29 U.S.C. §§ 1051(1), 1081(a) (1998).
138. 490 U.S. at 118-19, 109 S. Ct. at 1675.
139. Id. at 120-21, 109 S. Ct. at 1675-76.
140. 498 U.S. 52, 111 S. Ct. 403 (1990).
141. Id. at 54, Ill S. Ct. at 405-06.
142. See supra notes 64-79 and accompanying text. In Metropolitan Life v. Massachusetts, the
Court acknowledged that its construction of the saving clause in certain preemption situations would
leave insured plans open to indirect regulation while self-funded plans would not be so regulated.
471 U.S. 724, 747, 105 S. Ct. 2380, 2393 (1985).
143. The facts of this case were particularly egregious. As a result of the automobile accident,
the plan beneficiary was seriously and permanently injured. At the time her tort suit was settled,
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plan, relying upon Pennsylvania's anti-subrogation law which provided: "In
actions arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, there shall be
no right of subrogation or reimbursement from a claimant's tort recovery with
respect to ... benefits... payable under... [a]ny program, group contract or
other arrangement for the payment of benefits."'"
The plan brought a diversity action against the beneficiary seeking a
declaratory judgment that it was entitled to reimbursement. 4 Both the district
court "" and the Third Circuit 47 found that the anti-subrogation statute pro-
hibited FMC's exercise of subrogation rights on the plan participant's claim
against the driver. Noting that the Third Circuit's holding conflicted with
decisions of other appellate courts that had construed ERISA's deemer clause to
protect self-funded plans from all state insurance regulation, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari.
148
The Court initially recognized that, by its plain language, the anti-subroga-
tion law "relate[d] to" an employee benefit plan. 149 Next, the Court held that
because the statute directly controlled the terms of insurance contracts by
invalidating any subrogation provisions the contracts contained, the statute fell
within the saving clause as a law regulating insurance.5 Turning its focus to
the deemer clause, the Court held: "We view the language of the deemer clause
... to be either coextensive with or broader, not narrower, than that of the
saving clause." Applying this broad construction of the deemer clause, the Court
concluded that, if a plan is insured, a state may regulate it indirectly through
regulation of its insurer and its insurer's insurance contracts; if the plan is
uninsured, the state may not regulate it.'s' As a result, the anti-subrogation law
was not saved from preemption because the state could not deem this self-funded
plan to be an insurer.'52
The dissent faulted the majority for drawing "a broad and illogical"
distinction between self-insured plans and insured plans, arguing that had
Congress intended this result, it could have stated simply that "all State laws are
resulting in recovery of $49,875.50, plus accrued interest, her medical expenses were $178,000.00
and the cost of future care was unknown. FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 885 F.2d 79, 80 (3d Cir. 1989).
144. Pennsylvania's Motor Vehicle Fin. Responsibility Law, 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 1719 and
1720 (1987).
145. 498 U.S. at 54-56, 111 S. Ct. at 406.
146. 731 F. Supp. 710 (W.D. Penn. 1989).
147. 889 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1989).
148. 498 U.S. at 56, Il S. Ct. at 406-07.
149. Id. at 58-60, ItI S. Ct. at 407-08.
150. Id. at 60-61, III S. Ct. at 409. The Court held the Pennsylvania law was subject to
ERISA's insurance saving clause because the law directly controlled the terms of insurance contracts
by invalidating subrogation provisions contained therein and because the law did not merely have an
impact on the insurance industry, but was instead aimed at it.
151. Id. at 64-65, 111 S. Ct. at 411.
152. Id.
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pre-empted insofar as they relate to any self-insured employee plan.""' The
dissent also took issue with the majority's reading of the deemer clause "as
merely reinjecting into the scope of ERISA's pre-emption clause those same
exempted state laws insofar as they relate to self-insured plans." Finally, the
dissent maintained that no rational reason existed for permitting a self-funded
plan to enforce a subrogation clause against an injured employee while depriving
an insured plan the same right. 5 '
That same year, the Court issued its opinion in Ingersoll-Rand Co. v.
McClendon.' There, an employee brought a state law wrongful discharge
claim alleging he was terminated four months before his pension vested in order
to prevent his receipt of benefits. Eschewing any ERISA claims, plaintiff sought
compensatory and punitive damages, as well as future lost wages under various
state law tort and contract theories. The lower court ruled in the defendant's
favor on the basis that plaintiff was employed at-will. 6 The Texas Supreme
Court, however, reversed,' and established a public policy exception to the
employment at-will doctrine for the protection of employees' pension plan
interests. 58
Granting certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that, to
succeed in this cause of action, plaintiff would have to prove "that the principal
reason for his termination was the employer's desire to avoid contributing to or
paying benefits under the employee's pension fund."' 59 The Court maintained:
"The existence of a pension plan is a critical factor in establishing liability under
the State's wrongful discharge law. As a result, this cause of action relates not
merely to pension benefits, but to the essence of the pension plan itself."'6
Accordingly, the Court held that the claims related to an ERISA plan and were
preempted.' 6
The Court also stated that, even if there were no express preemption in the
case, the Texas cause of action would be preempted because the plaintiff's
wrongful discharge claim fell squarely within the ambit of ERISA section
510,62 which provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge...
a participant or beneficiary... for the purpose of interfering with the attainment
of any right to which such participant may become entitled under the
plan . .. "' By its terms, Section 510 protects plan participants from
termination motivated by an employer's desire to prevent a pension from vesting.
153. Id. at 65, III S. Ct. at 411.
154. Id. at 65-66, I1 S. Ct. at 411.
155. 498 U.S. 133, 111 S. Ct. 478 (1990).
156. 757 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
157. 779 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. 1989).
158. 498 U.S. at 135-36, 1It S. Ct. at 481.
159. Id. at 140, 11I S. Ct. at 483.
160. Id. (emphasis in the original).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 142, 11I S. Ct. at 484-85.
163. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1998).
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The Court observed that Congress viewed this section as a crucial part of ERISA
because, without it, employers would be able to manipulate employment to
circumvent the provision of promised benefits.'" As such, the Court conclud-
ed: "We have no doubt that this claim is prototypical of the kind Congress
intended to cover under § 510.,, 165 Because the Texas cause of action purport-
ed to provide a remedy for the violation of a right expressly guaranteed by, and
exclusively enforced through, ERISA, the Court held that "due regard" for
ERISA required preemption of the state law.'"
The Court's next case, District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Board
of Trade, 67 is regarded as the "high water mark" for ERISA preemption.
There, the District of Columbia amended its workers' compensation laws and
required employers providing health insurance to their employees to provide
equivalent health insurance coverage for injured employees eligible for workers'
compensation benefits.' The Greater Washington Board of Trade, a nonprofit
164. 498 U.S. at 143, III S. Ct. at 485 (citing Sen. Rep. No. 93-127, at 35-36 (1973); H.R.
Rep. No. 93-533, at 17 (1973)).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 145, III S. Ct. at 486. Also significant in Ingersoll-Rand is Justice O'Connor's dicta
in the final paragraph of the opinion:
The preceding discussion also responds to the Texas court's attempt to distinguish this
case as one not within ERISA's purview .... [T]here is no basis in § 502(a)'s language
for limiting ERISA actions to only those which seek "pension benefits." It is clear that
the relief requested here is well within the power of federal courts to provide.
Consequently, it is no answer to a pre-emption argument that a particular plaintiff is not
seeking recovery of pension benefits.
Id. at 145, III S. Ct. at 486 (emphasis added). The plaintiff in Ingersoll-Rand requested punitive
and compensatory damages. Based on Justice O'Connor's comments, some plaintiffs argued that
Ingersoll-Rand supported claims for ex contractu damages, including punitive damages, under
ERISA. Several district courts accepted that argument. See, e.g., International Union, United
Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers v. Midland Steel Prods. Co., 771 F.
Supp. 860, 863 (N.D. Ohio 1991); Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. Lewis, 753 F. Supp. 345 (N.D.
Ala. 1990). However, the argument has been soundly rejected by appellate courts. For instance, the
Eleventh Circuit, in holding that extracontractual damages are not available under Section 502(aX3),
explicitly found that such a holding did not conflict with Ingersoll-Rand. In McRae v. Seafarers'
Welfare Plan, 920 F.2d 819 (11 th Cir. 1991), Judge John Minor Wisdom, sitting by designation,
explained the Ingersoll-Rand dicta as follows:
The Supreme Court was stating that federal law provides relief for ERISA actions other
than those that seek to recover pension benefits, such as the plaintiff's cause of action for
wrongful termination. The Supreme Court is not holding that the specific remedies this
plaintiff had sought under state law are necessarily the remedies that will be afforded him
should he be granted relief under ERISA § 502.
Id. at 821. See also Harsch v. Eisenberg, 956 F.2d 651, 660 (7th Cir. 1992) ("[W]e think the
prudent course is to follow Judge Wisdom in his interpretation. We will continue to doubt the
availability of extracontractual damages under ERISA until a more plausible signal reaches us from
above.").
167. 506 U.S. 125, 113 S. Ct. 580 (1992).
168. D.C. Code Ann. § 36-307(a-iX) (Supp. 1992) added the following requirement to the
worker's compensation laws: "Any employer who provides health insurance coverage for an
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corporation that provided health insurance coverage for its employees, filed suit
to enjoin enforcement of the statute on the ground that the "equivalent" benefits
requirement was preempted by ERISA. " 9 The district court granted the
District of Columbia's motion to dismiss, but the appellate court reversed. 70
The Court held the statute specifically referred to welfare benefit plans
regulated by ERISA and on that basis alone was preempted.'' The Court
rejected the District of Columbia's contention that the statute was exempt from
preemption under Section 4(b) of ERISA, 72 which exempts from ERISA
coverage employee benefit plans "maintained solely for the purpose of complying
with applicable workers' compensation laws . . .": The Court explained:
"The exemptions from ERISA coverage... do not limit the pre-emptive sweep
of [the preemption clause] once it is determined that the law in question relates
to a covered plan."'
7 4
Relying on Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts, 75 the
District of Columbia also argued ERISA's preemption provision should be
construed to require a two-step analysis: If the state law "related to" an ERISA-
covered plan, it could still survive preemption if employers could comply with
the law through separately administered plans exempt under Section 4(b).
Rejecting that contention, the Court distinguished Metropolitan Life, stating that
its previous decision only construed the scope of the saving clause's safe harbor
for state laws regulating insurance and did not purport to add any further gloss
on the preemption provision.'76 Ultimately, the Court simply reiterated that
any state law imposing requirements by reference to employee benefit plans
subject to ERISA "must yield to ERISA."'"
Disagreeing with the majority, the dissent appeared to foreshadow the
Court's future path when it stated:
Nothing in ERISA suggests an intent to supersede the State's efforts to
enact fair and complete remedies for work-related injuries; it is difficult
to imagine how a State could measure an injured worker's health
benefits without referring to the specific health benefits that worker
receives. Any State that wishes to effect the equitable goal of the
employee shall provide health insurance coverage equivalent to the existing health insurance coverage
of the employee while the employee receives or is eligible to receive workers' compensation benefits
under this chapter."
169. 506 U.S. at 128, 113 S. Ct. at 582.
170. 948 F.2d 1317 (1991).
171. 506 U.S. at 130, 113 S. Ct. at 583.
172. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b) (1993).
173. 506 U.S. at 131, 113 S. CL at 584.
174. Id. (citing Alessi, 451 U.S. 504, 525, 101 S. CL 1895, 1907, (1981) ("lt is of no moment
that New Jersey intrudes indirectly, through a workers' compensation law, rather than directly,
through a statute called 'pension regulation'").
175. 471 U.S. 724, 105 S. Ct. 2380 (1985). See supra notes 64-79 and accompanying text.
176. 506 U.S. at 132, 113 S. Ct. at 585.
177. Id. at 132-33, 113 S. Ct. at 584.
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District's statute will be forced by the Court's opinion to require a
predetermined rate of health insurance coverage that bears no relation
to the compensation package of each injured worker. The Court thereby
requires workers' compensation laws to shed their most characteristic
element: post-injury compensation based on each individual workers'
pre-injury level of compensation."7 '
The dissent also maintained that, instead of mechanically repeating earlier
dictionary definitions of the word "relate" as its only guide in an important and
difficult area of statutory construction, the Court should pause to consider the
wisdom of the basic rule disfavoring federal pre-emption of state laws, and the
specific concerns identified in the legislative history as the basis for federal
preemption.'79 With preemption of the field, Congress rounded out the
protection afforded participants by eliminating the threat of conflicting and
inconsistent State and local regulation. However, because the statute at issue did
not regulate "even one inch of the pre-empted field, and pose[d] no threat
whatsoever of conflicting and inconsistent state regulation," the dissent asserted
that by holding that the law was preempted, "the Court has already taken a step
that Congress neither intended nor foresaw."' 80
III. A NEW LOOK AT PREEMPTION: SUPREME COURT CASES 1993-1997
In John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Harris Trust & Savings
Bank,"' the Court was called upon to decide whether ERISA's fiduciary
standards' 2 governed an insurance company's conduct in relation to certain
annuity contracts.' After determining the insurance company was a fiduciary,
the Court addressed the insurer's argument that ERISA's fiduciary standards
could not govern an insurer's administration of general account contracts because
to do so would pose irreconcilable conflicts between state and federal regulatory
regimes."'
The Court began its analysis by noting that ERISA requires fiduciaries to act
"solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and . . . for the
178. Id. at 137-38, 113 S. Ct. at 587.
179. Id. at 138, 113 S. Ct. at 588.
180. Id.
181. 510 U.S. 86, 114 S. Ct. 517 (1993).
182. The obligations of an ERISA fiduciary are described in ERISA section 4, 29 U.S.C. §
1104(a) (1998). A fiduciary must discharge its duties with respect to a plan "solely in the interest
of the participants and beneficiaries and-(A) for the exclusive purpose of: (i) providing benefits
to participants and their beneficiaries .... A person is a fiduciary with respect to an employee
benefit plan "to the extent (i) he exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control
respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or
disposition of its assets . . . ." ERISA § 3(21 )(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21 )(A) (1998).
183. 510 U.S. at 89, 114 S. Ct. at 521.
184. Id. at 97, 114 S. Ct. at 525.
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exclusive purpose of ... providing benefits to participants and beneficia-
ries.""' On the other hand, state law required an insurer "to consider the
interests of all of its contractholders, creditors and shareholders" and to "maintain
equity among its various constituencies." 86 The insurer contended ERISA
must yield to state law because Congress reserved to the states primary
responsibility for regulation of the insurance industry.' In response, the Court
conceded that the law at issue, because it concerned the management of the
general account assets of an insurer, was saved from preemption because it
regulated insurance. At the same time, however, the Court maintained:
[W]e discern no solid basis for believing that Congress, when it
designed ERISA, intended fundamentally to alter traditional preemption
analysis. State law governing insurance generally is not displaced, but
"where [that] law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress," federal preemption oc-
curs.188
In this preemption analysis, the John Hancock Court did not rely on
Shaw's"" "reference to or connection with" approach for determining whether
a state law was preempted under ERISA. Rather, the Court emphasized
"traditional preemption" standards, noting that state law is generally not
displaced. This description of ERISA preemption signaled the first retreat from
the Court's prior expansive interpretations.
Two years later, in New York State Conference of Blue Cross v. Travelers
Insurance Co. ("Travelers")," the Court held that a state law requiring
hospitals to collect surcharges from patients covered by commercial insurers, but
not from patients insured by Blue Cross/Blue Shield, was not preempted by
ERISA. The Court noted that although the preemption provision is clearly
expansive, the meaning of "relate to" must be limited by the objectives of the
ERISA statute. 9 Signaling a departure from prior preemption opinions, the
Court observed:
If "relate to" were taken to extend to the furthest stretch of its indeter-
minacy, then for all practical purposes pre-emption would never run its
course, for "[r]eally, universally, relations stop nowhere." But that, of
course, would be to read Congress's words of limitation as mere sham,
and to read the presumption against pre-emption out of the law
185. Id. at 97, 114 S. Ct. at 525 (citing ERISA § 494(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1998)).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 98, 114 S. Ct. at 525.
188. Id. at 99, 114 S. Ct. at 525-26 (citing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248,
104 S. Ct. 615, 621 (1984)).
189. 463 U.S. 85, 103 S. Ct. 2890 (1983). See supra notes 40-63 and accompanying text.
190: 514 U.S. 645, 115 S. Ct. 1671 (1995).
191. Id. at 655-56. 115 S. Ct. at 1677.
1998] 1021
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
whenever Congress speaks to the matter with generality. That said, we
have to recognize that our prior attempt to construe the phrase "relate
to" does not give us much help drawing the line here.' 92
Analyzing whether the statute related to ERISA plans, the Court held the
statute did not have any "reference to" ERISA plans because it was indiscrimi-
nately imposed upon HMOs and patients, regardless of whether the commercial
coverage or membership was secured by an ERISA plan, private purchase, or
otherwise.'9 3 Embarking next on the "connection with" test, the Court noted:
[T]his still leaves us to question whether the surcharge laws have a
"connection with" the ERISA plans, and here an uncritical literalism is
no more help than in trying to construe "relate to." For the same
reasons that infinite relations cannot be the measure of pre-emption,
neither can infinite connections. We simply must go beyond the
unhelpful text and the frustrating difficulty of defining its key
term, and look instead to the objectives of the ERISA statute as
a guide to the scope of the state law that Congress understood
would survive.
9 4
The Court then observed that, in enacting ERISA, Congress intended to
ensure that plans and plan sponsors would be subject to a uniform body of
benefits law. The goal, the Court said, "was to minimize the administrative and
financial burden of complying with conflicting directives among states or
between states and the federal government and to prevent the potential for
conflict in substantive law."'93 However, "cost-uniformity was almost certainly
not an object of pre-emption, just as laws with only an indirect economic effect
on the relative costs of various health insurance packages in a given State are a
far cry from those 'conflicting directives' from which Congress meant to insulate
ERISA plans.' 196
The Court observed that although there was no evidence the surcharges
would drive every health insurance consumer to Blue Cross, economically, the
law made Blue Cross more attractive (or less unattractive) as an insurance
alternative. As a result, the Court found the regulation did not "bind plan
administrators to any particular choice" and had only an "indirect economic
effect" on choices made by insurance purchasers of ERISA plans.'97 The Court
held the regulation was "no different from myriad state laws in areas traditionally
subject to local regulation" and it was not the intent of Congress to preempt such
192. Id. (internal citations omitted).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. (citing Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 142, 111 S. Ct. at 484).
196. 514 U.S. at 661-62, 115 S. Ct. at 1680 (citations omitted).
197. Id. at 659, 115 S. Ct. at 1679.
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laws. 9 Striking the balance between conflicting state and federal regulation,
the Court stressed the importance of traditional state police powers:
While Congress's extension of preemption to all "state laws relating to
benefit plans" was meant to sweep more broadly than "state laws
dealing with the subject matters covered by ERISA[,] reporting,
disclosure, fiduciary responsibility, and the like," ... nothing in the
language of the Act or the context of its passage indicates that Congress
chose to displace general health care regulation, which historically has
been a matter of local concern. .. .
The Court did attempt to draw some boundaries where state law would run
afoul of ERISA preemption. Respondents had argued that the New York law
was preempted because, under Metropolitan Life,2" the challenged law mandat-
ed specific plan benefits and, as such, related to employee benefit plans. While
holding that respondents' reading of Metropolitan Life was too broad, the Court
noted there were limits to state regulation in this area:
In any event, Metropolitan Life can not carry the weight the commercial
insurers would place on it. The New York surcharges do not impose
the kind of substantive coveragerequirement binding plan administrators
that was at issue in Metropolitan Life. Although even in the absence of
mandated coverage there might be a point at which an exorbitant tax
leaving consumers with a Hobson's choice would be treated as imposing
a substantive mandate, no showing has been made here that the
surcharges are so prohibitive as to force all health insurance consumers
to contract with the Blues. As they currently stand, the surcharges do
not require plans to deal with only one insurer, or to insure against an
entire category of illnesses they might otherwise choose to leave without
coverage.2"'
The Court's evolving preemption analysis was further clarified in California
Division of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Construction, N.A., Inc.
("Dillingham")."' At issue was whether ERISA preempted a California
"prevailing wage" statute that permitted public works contractors to pay less than
prevailingjourneyman wage to apprentices in approved apprenticeship programs.
The Court noted:
To determine whether a state law has the forbidden connection, we look
both to "the objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of
198. Id. at 668, 115 S. Ct. at 1683.
199. Id. at 661-62, 115 S. Ct. at 1680 (internal citations omitted).
200. 471 U.S. 724, 105 S. Ct. 2380 (1985).
201. 514 U.S. at 663-64, 115 S. Ct. at 1681 (emphasis added).
202. 519 U.S. 316, 117 S. Ct. 832 (1997).
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the state law that Congress understood would survive," as well as to the
nature of the effect of the state law on ERISA plans.2 03
Relying on Mackey,2° Ingersoll-Rand,05 and Greater Washington Board
of Trade,06 the Court clarified the "reference to" step in Shaw's "relate to"
test. The Court found a "reference" exists where the state law specifically refers
to ERISA plans, where it acts "immediately and exclusively upon ERISA plans,"
or where the existence of such plans "is essential to the law's opera-
tion." O7 Noting that an apprenticeship program may be paid for out of an
employer's general assets, so that an ERISA plan is not essential, the Court
found that there was no "reference" to an ERISA plan in the prevailing wage
statute.08
Asserting that the prevailing wage statute at issue was "indistinguishable"
from the surcharge statute in Travelers,0 9 the Court found there was no
"connection" to an ERISA plan. In so holding, the Court relied upon three
factors: (1) that wages paid on public work projects have long been subject to
state regulation; (2) that such regulations are "quite remote from the areas with
which ERISA is expressly concerned-reporting, disclosure, fiduciary
responsibility, and the like," and (3) that while the regulation provided,
"some measure of economic incentive to comport with the state's requirements,"
other reasons existed for obtaining state sanctioning of an apprenticeship
program." °
Especially significant was the concurring opinion written by Justice Scalia,
joined by Justice Ginsburg. Justice Scalia's concurrence characterized the level
of Supreme Court activity in the ERISA preemption arena as "suggesting that our
prior decisions have not succeeded in bringing clarity to the law., 21' Further-
more, although he joined the Court's opinion in Dillingham, Scalia criticized its
underlying rationale:
I join the Court's opinion today because it is a fair description of our
prior case law, and a fair application of the more recent of that case
law. Today's opinion is no more likely than our earlier ones, however,
to bring clarity to this field-precisely because it does obeisance to all
our prior cases, instead of acknowledging that the criteria set forth in
some of them have in effect been abandoned. 12
203. 117 S. Ct. at 838 (citations omitted).
204. 486 U.S. 825, 108 S. Ct. 2182 (1988). See supra notes 114-130 and accompanying text.
205. 498 U.S. 133, 111 S. Ct. 478 (1990). See supra notes 155-166 and accompanying text.
206. 506 U.S. 125, 113 S. Ct. 580 (1992). See supra notes 167-180 and accompanying text.
207. 117 S. CL at 838 (citations omitted).
208. 117 S. Ct. at 839.
209. 514 U.S. 645, 115 S. Ct. 1671 (1995). See supra notes 190-201 and accompanying text.
210. 117 S. Ct. at 840-42.
211. 117S. Ct. at843.
212. Id.
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The concurrence asserted that applying the "relate to" provision according
to its terms "was a project doomed to failure, since, as many a curbstone
philosopher has observed, everything is related to everything else."" 3
Challenging the other members of the Court, Justice Scalia went on to
state:
I think it would greatly assist our function of clarifying the law if we
simply acknowledged that our first take on this statute was wrong; that
the "relate to" clause of the pre-emption provision is meant, not to set
forth a test for pre-emption, but rather to identify the field in which
ordinary field pre-emption applies-namely, the field of laws regulating
"employee benefit plans .... ." Our new approach to ERISA pre-
emption is set forth in John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust
and Say. Bank: "we discern no solid basis for believing that Congress,
when it designed ERISA, intended fundamentally to alter traditional
pre-emption analysis." I think it accurately describes our current
ERISA jurisprudence to say that we apply ordinary field pre-emption,
and, of course, ordinary conflict pre-emption. Nothing more mysterious
than that; and except as establishing that, "relates to" is irrelevant.
21 4
The implications of this concurring opinion are difficult to determine. The
opinion states the Court is applying traditional concepts of "field" and "conflict"
preemption in recent ERISA cases. The cases relied on indicate that state law
can be preempted in either of two general ways. First, if Congress evidences an
intent to occupy a given field, any state law falling within that field is
preempted. 1 Second, if Congress has not entirely displaced state regulation
over the matter in question, state law is still preempted to the extent it actually
conflicts with federal law, that is, when it is impossible to comply with both state
and federal law, or where the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplish-
ment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.216
The Court's next 1997 case was De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Medical and
Clinical Services Fund."t 7  The question before the Court was whether the
"opaque" language in ERISA's preemption provision precluded New York from
imposing a gross receipts tax on the income of medical centers operated by
ERISA funds." 8 The Court began its analysis by endorsing its prior approach
213. Id.
214. Id. (citations omitted).
215. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248, 104 S. Ct. 515, 621 (1984) (citing
Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153, 102 S. Ct. 3014, 3022 (1982);
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S. Ct. 1146, 1152 (1947)).
216. Id. (citing Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143, 83 S.
Ct. 1210, 1217-18 (1963); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S. Ct. 399, 404 (1941)).
217. 520 U.S. 806, 117 S. Ct. 1747 (1997).
218. 117 S. Ct. at 1749. The New York statute at issue, entitled the Health Facility Assessment,
N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2807-d (McKinney 1990), imposed a tax on gross receipts for patient
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in Travelers and Dillingham that the "relate to" clause, while expansive, must
have practical limits, and the normal presumption against preemption will only
be overcome after examining the objectives Congress sought to achieve with
ERISA 19
Following this approach, the Court observed that historically, the police
powers of the states have included the regulation of health and safety. Although
the state law at issue was a revenue raising measure, it operated in a field that
has been traditionally occupied by the states because it targeted only the health
care industry.220 As a result, the burden was on the parties challenging the
statute to overcome "the starting presumption that Congress does not intend to
supplant state law. '"22'
Before dealing specifically with the New York law at issue, the majority
distinguished prior decisions where the Court held preemption applied:
This is not a case in which New York has forbidden a method of
calculating pension benefits that federal law permits,2 22 or required
employers to provide certain benefits. 22 '3 Nor is it a case in which the
existence of a pension plan is a critical element of a state law cause of
action,224 or one in which the state statute contains provisions that
expressly refer to ERISA or ERISA plans.22
Instead, the Court likened the statute to the one at issue in Travelers, i.e., one of
a myriad state laws of general applicability that impose some burdens on the
services at hospitals, residential health care facilities, and diagnostic and treatment centers. The
assessments became a part of the State's general revenues.
219. 117 S. Ct. at 1751.
220. 117 S. Ct. at 1752 n.l0.
221. 117 S. Ct. at 1752.
222. See, e.g., Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504,524-25, 101 S. Ct. 1895, 1907
(1981) ("Whatever the purpose or purposes of the New Jersey statute, we conclude that it 'relatels]
to pension plans' governed by ERISA because it eliminates one method for calculating pension
benefits-integration-that is permitted by federal law.").
223. See, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 103 S. Ct. 2890 (1983) (ERISA pre-
empted state law requiring the provision of pregnancy benefits); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 105 S. Ct. 2380 (1985) (law that required benefit plans to include
minimum mental health benefits "related to" ERISA plans).
224. See, e.g., Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. 133, 139-40, 111 S. Ct. 478, 483 ("We are not dealing
here with a generally applicable statute that makes no reference to, or indeed functions irrespective
of, the existence of an ERISA plan .... Here, the existence of a pension plan is a critical factor
in establishing liability under the State's wrongful discharge law. As a result, this cause of action
relates not merely to pension benefits, but to the essence of the pension plan itself.").
225. Id. (citing Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 828-30, 108
S. Ct. 2182, 2184-86 (a provision that explicitly refers to ERISA in defining the scope of the state
law's application is pre-empted); District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125,
130-31, 113 S. Ct. 580, 583-84 (1992) ("Section 2(c)(2) of the District's Equity Amendment Act
specifically refers to welfare benefit plans regulated by ERISA and on that basis alone is pre-
empted.").
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administration of ERISA plans but nevertheless do not "relate to" them within
the meaning of preemption provision." The Court concluded: "Any state tax,
or other law, that increases the cost of providing benefits to covered employees
will have some effect on the administration of ERISA plans, but that simply
cannot mean that every state law with such an effect is pre-empted by the federal
statute." '7
In its third and final 1997 preemption case, Boggs v. Boggs,2 8 the Court
confronted "the intersection of ERISA pension law and state community property
law. 2129  Isaac Boggs worked for South Central Bell from 1949 until his
retirement in 1985. He and his first wife, Dorothy, were married when he began
working for the company and they had three sons. When Dorothy died, she
bequeathed one third of her estate in full ownership to her husband, and a
lifetime usufruct230 in the remaining two thirds. She left her sons the naked
ownership 23' of the remaining two thirds, subject to Boggs' usufruct.231
After the death of his first wife, Isaac Boggs married for the second time.
When he retired in 1985, he received various benefits from his employer's
retirement plans, including a lump-sum savings plan distribution, which was
rolled over into an individual retirement account (IRA); shares of stock from the
company's employee stock ownership plan (ESOP); and a monthly annuity
payment.3
When Isaac Boggs died, he was survived by his second wife and three
children from his first marriage. A dispute arose between the survivors as to
ownership of Isaac Boggs' employee benefits. The children sought to enforce
the provisions of the first wife's will, which would have provided them two-
thirds of her estate, including her community property interest in Boggs'
employee benefits. 234 Under ERISA, the second wife, as the surviving spouse,
226. Id. (citing Travelers, 514 U.S. at 668, 115 S. Ct. at 1683 and Dillinghaa, II7 S. Ct. at
841-42).
227. 117 S. Ct. at 1753.
228. 117 S. Ct. at 1754.
229. 117 S. Ct. at 1760.
230. Louisiana Civil Code article 535 defines a "usufruct" as "a real right of limited duration
on the property of another. The features of the right vary with the nature of the things subject to it
as consumables or nonconsumables." A lifetime usufruct is roughly equivalent to the common law
"life estate." Louisiana Civil Code article 890 provides that "If the deceased spouse is survived by
descendants, the surviving spouse shall have a usufruct over the decedent's share of the community
property to the extent that the decedent has not disposed of it by testament. This usufruct terminates
when the surviving spouse dies or remarries, whichever occurs first."
231. Naked ownership grants the right of disposition to the person whose property is subject to
a usufruct. Naked ownership is roughly the equivalent of common law remainder interest. Boggs
v. Boggs, 89 F.3d 1169, 1172 n.8 (5th Cir. 1996).
232. 117 S. Ct. at 1758.
233. Id.
234. Id. Under Louisiana community property law, each spouse owns "a present undivided one-
half interest" in all community assets, which vests from the moment of acquisition. La. Civ. Code
art. 2336. Pension benefits, if acquired during the marriage, are generally considered a community
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was entitled to a survivor's annuity, and she had not waived her right to the
survivor's annuity, nor had she consented to having the sons designated as the
beneficiaries.' 5 Accordingly, she contested the validity of the first wife's will,
and argued that the sons' claim was preempted by ERISA because it conflicted
with ERISA's surviving spouse annuity and anti-alienation provisions.23 .
The federal district court'" and the Fifth Circuit?" held that ERISA did
not preempt Louisiana community property law. Noting a split between the
Ninth and Fifth Circuits, and that the issue affected nine community property
states with more than 80 million residents and over $1 trillion in ERISA
qualified pension plans, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.""
The Court stated at the outset:
We can begin, and in this case end, the analysis by simply asking if
state law conflicts with the provisions of ERISA or operates to frustrate
its objects. We hold that there is a conflict, which suffices to resolve
asset. Hare v. Hodgins, 586 So. 2d 118, 122 (La. 1991). Thus, if one spouse receives benefits from
a pension plan, he or she must account to the other spouse for this benefit which vests equally in
both spouses from the instant of acquisition. Boggs v. Boggs, 82 F.3d 90, 96 (5th Cir. 1996).
Additionally, Louisiana Civil Code article 890.1 now provides that "if a recurring payment is being
made from a public or private pension or retirement plan, an annuity policy or plan, an individual
retirement account, a Keogh plan, a simplified employee plan, or any other similar retirement plan,
to one partner or to both partners of a marriage, and the payment constitutes community property,
and one spouse dies, the surviving spouse shall enjoy a legal usufruct over any portion of the
continuing recurring payment which was the deceased spouse's share of their community property,
provided the source of the benefit is due to payments made by or on behalf of the survivor."
235. 117 S. Ct. at 1758. The surviving spouse annuity provision requires that every qualified
joint and survivor annuity include an annuity payable to a non-participant surviving spouse. The
survivor's annuity may not be waived by the participant, absent certain limited circumstances, unless
the spouse consents in writing to the designation of another beneficiary, which designation cannot
be changed without further spousal consent, witnessed by a plan representative or notary public. 117
S. Ct. at 1761 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1055(dXI) and (cX2) (1998)).
236. 117 S. Ct. at 1758. The anti-alienation provision states "benefits under the [qualified
ERISA plan] may not be assigned or alienated." 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1998).
237. Boggs v. Boggs, 849 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. La. 1994).
238. Boggs v. Boggs, 82 F.3d 90 (5th Cir 1996). In an opinion authored by Judge Wiener, six
members of the Fifth Circuit vehemently dissented from the failure of the court to rehear the case
en banc. 89 F.3d 1169 (5th Cir. 1996). Foreshadowing the Supreme Court's position, Judge Wiener
argued that a testamentary transfer of an interest in undistributed retirement benefits frustrates
ERISA's goals of securing national uniformity in pension plan administration and of ensuring that
retirees and their dependents are the actual recipients of retirement income. Id. at 1176-78.
Regarding uniformity, Judge Wiener observed that each community property state has its own unique
set of specific rules affecting ownership and management of such property, including some notable
differences from state to state. Further, all community property rules differ substantially from the
concomitant rules of non-community states. As such, Judge Wiener maintained that allowing these
disparate laws to trump ERISA could not help but have a materially adverse impact on plan
administration: "Quite simply, ERISA's goal of uniformity would be unattainable if the ultimate
enjoyment of ERISA plan benefits were left to the vicissitudes of the varying and disparate marital
property laws of the several states, be they community or separate." Id. at 1177.
239. 117 S. Ct. at 1759-60.
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the case. We need not inquire whether the statutory phrase "relate to"
provides further and additional support for the pre-emption claim.""0
Although it did not refer to DeBuono, Dillingham, or Travelers in its
holding, the Court relied on "conventional conflict preemption principals" to
preempt Louisiana state law. 4' The Court then explained that the statutory
object of the joint and survivor annuity provision was to ensure a stream of
income to surviving spouses."' As such, the Court concluded that ERISA
would be undermined by allowing a predeceasing spouse, her heirs, and legatees
to have a community property interest in the survivor's annuity.4 3
IV. WHAT DOES IT ALL MEAN AND WHERE ARE WE HEADED?
While hinting at a new direction in preemption analysis in John Hancock
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank,14 the Supreme
Court was openly skeptical of the direction of ERISA preemption jurisprudence
in New York State Conference of Blue Cross v. Travelers Insurance Co. ("Travel-
ers"),24 when it stated that past case law was unhelpful to the process of
examining New York's surcharge law.246 Two years later, concurring in
California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Construction,
N.A., Inc.,"' Justice Scalia candidly expressed his opinion that the Court's
earlier "relate to" jurisprudence was simply wrong and that the criteria set forth
in those cases had been "abandoned."
It is submitted that in surveying the Supreme Court's preemption analysis,
the test for preemption has changed from earlier efforts to read literally the
clause "relate to" to a more pragmatic approach asking: "Is this the type of law
Congress intended to preempt?" This new approach is coupled by an emphasis
240. 117 S. Ct. at 1760-61.
241. See also National Auto. Dealers and Assocs. Retirement Trust v. Arbeitman, 89 F.3d 496
(8th Cir. 1996), a case preceding Boggs with similar facts. There, first and second wives claimed
the decedent's pension plan benefits. The first wife argued that the second wife waived her claim
for pension benefits by executing a prenuptial agreement. id. at 498-99. The Eighth Circuit held,
inter alia, the prenuptial agreement did not constitute a waiver of the second wife's right to receive
pension plan benefits. Id. at 500-01. The Court also held that the first wife's state law equitable
estoppel claim was preempted by ERISA because to enforce the state law claim was inconsistent with
specific ERISA provisions and the terms of the decedent's pension plan. Id. at 502.
242. 117 S. Ct. at 1761.
243. 117 S. Ct. at 1762.
244. See supra notes 181-189 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 190-201 and accompanying text.
246. The Court noted: "(Wie have to recognize that our prior attempt to construe the phrase
'relate to' does not give us much help drawing the line here." Travelers, 514 U.S. 645, 655-56, 115
S. Ct. 1671, 1677 (1995).
247. See supra notes 211-214 and accompanying text.
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on traditional State police powers. 4  Some trends are emerging in the lower
courts.
First, these trends have not altered traditional preemption analysis where a
participant or beneficiary sues for benefits and asserts state law benefit claims.
Most courts continue to hold ERISA preempts plan participants' state law fraud
claims,2 49 wrongful death claims,25  and employment retaliation claims."'
However, when one of the parties to the suit is outside of the "traditional ERISA
relationships," i.e. the employer, the plan, the plan fiduciaries, and the beneficia-
ries/participants,S 2 this factor weighs heavily against preemption. Some courts
have declined to apply preemption where claims are asserted against an
independent insurance agent for fraud in the sale of a policy" 3 or where claims
are asserted against non-fiduciary third party administrators for breach of
contract.
2 54
Following Dillingham, some courts have declined to preempt traditional state
laws regulating employment and construction activities. In Operating Engineers
Health and Welfare Trust Fund v. JWJ Contracting Co.,25 certain ERISA trust
funds sued under Arizona law to enforce an obligation to pay funds owed to the
trusts by the employer's surety after the employer's bankruptcy. Focusing upon
the surety's status as third party to the employer-trust fund and ERISA
248. See. e.g., California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dilingham Constr., N.A..
Inc., 117 S. Ct. 832 (1997): "Given the paucity of indication in ERISA and its legislative history
of any intent on the part of Congress to pre-empt state apprenticeship training standards, or state
prevailing wage laws that incorporate them, we are reluctant to alter our ordinary 'assumption that
the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act."' 117 S. Ct.
at 838 (quoting Travelers, 514 U.S. at 653-54, 115 S. Ct. at 1676).
249. Engelhardt v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 139 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 1998); Hall v. Blue
Cross Blue Shield of Alabama, 134 F.3d 1063 (11 th Cir. 1998); Franklin v. QHG of Gadsden, 127
F.3d 1024 (11th Cir. 1997).
250. Turner v. Fallon Community Health Plan, 127 F.3d 196 (Ist Cir. 1997)
251. Kariotis v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 131 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 1997).
252. The emphasis on these traditional ERISA relationships, also described as the "ERISA
quartet" as a touchstone for preemption, was developed initially in Sommers Drug Stores Co.
Employee Profit Sharing Trust v. Corrigan Enters., Inc., 793 F.2d 1456 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1034, 1089 (1987).
253. Morestein v. National Ins. Serv. Inc., 93 F.3d 715 (11 th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
254. Michigan Affiliated Healthcare Sys., Inc. v. CC Sys. Corp. of Michigan, 139 F.3d 546 (6th
Cir. 1998); Arizona State Carpenter's Fund v. Citibank, 125 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 1997); Geweke Ford
v. St. Joseph's Omni Preferred Care, 130 F.3d 1355 (9th Cir. 1996). In Coyne & Delaney Co. v.
Selman, 98 F.3d 1457 (4th Cir. 1996), plaintiff was a small manufacturing company suing, a
company that designed and managed healthcare plans, under state common law for professional
malpractice. Following Travelers, the court held the state law did not mandate an employee benefit
structure plan, bind a plan administrator to particular choices or preclude uniform administrative
practice, or provide an alternate enforcement mechanism to obtain ERISA plan benefits. As a result,
the malpractice claim, a traditional state-based law of general applicability, did not implicate the
relations among the traditional ERISA plan entities and was not preempted by ERISA.
255. 135 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 1998).
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relationships generally, the court held that the state law was too tenuous, remote,
or peripheral to apply preemption.'-
In Trustees For Michigan Laborer's Health Care Fund v. Seaboard Surety
Co.,2 the Sixth Circuit held that a state law requiring bonds to ensure
payment of employee benefits was not preempted. The court noted a law
requiring bonds to ensure payment was of general applicability and was not
directed toward ERISA plans. It concluded the enforcement provisions of the
state law affected only the bonding contract and did not affect the administration
of ERISA trust funds. Implicit in its reasoning was the fact the defendant bond
company was not a traditional ERISA entity.
However, in Plumbing Industry Board. v. Howell Co., Inc.,2 8 the court
considered whether ERISA preempted a law providing employee benefit plans
with a lien against funds for a project when an employer failed to make
payments. As opposed to the surety cases, the entity actually making the
payments for the defaulting employer under the lien law was the general
contractor. The Second Circuit concluded this state law was preempted because
it directly conflicted with ERISA's specific delineation of the entities liable for
benefits.
Two cases from the Ninth Circuit portend future problems for application
of ERISA preemption. In Cisneros v. Unum Life Insurance Co.,29 at issue was
the application of California's "Notice-Prejudice"rule. This state law provided
that an insurance company could not deny benefits because it did not receive
timely notice of a claim unless it could prove actual prejudice. The insurer
refused to pay benefits because plaintiff failed to provide the insurance company
with timely notice of her claim. There was no question that the application of
the rule "related to" the ERISA plan. The only question was whether the rule
was saved from ERISA preemption under the three criteria of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act.2" Conceding that the state law did not satisfy all three criteria
of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the Ninth Circuit held the law was saved from
preemption because it applied to the insurance industry and became an integral
part of the relationship between the insurer and the insured. The practical effect
of this case was to add the "Notice-Prejudice" rule as a term to all insured
ERISA plans in California.
The Ninth Circuit revisited the notice rule in Ward v. Management Analysis
Co. Employee Disability Benefit Plan.26 Here, as in Cisneros, plaintiff gave
untimely notice of his claim to an insurance company. However, he argued that
he gave timely notice to his employer, who served as an agent for the insurance
company under California law. Contrary to California law, the terms of the plan
256. Id. at 679.
257. 137 F.3d 427 (6th Cir. 1998).
258. 126 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1997).
259. 134 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 1998).
260. See supra notes 74-75, 84-85 and accompanying text.
261. 135 F.3d 1276 (9th Cir. 1998).
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specifically and unequivocally stated that the employer was not the agent of the
insurance company. The Ninth Circuit then held ERISA did not preempt
California's agency law and held the employer was the insurer's agent, contrary
to the unambiguous language of the plan.
In explaining its new test, the Ninth Circuit concluded that only two types
of laws are now preempted: 1) laws that mandate employee benefit structures
or their administration; and 2) laws that provide alternative enforcement mecha-
nisms. Despite the fact that the application of California law resulted in
rewriting the plan, the court concluded this state law did not mandate benefit
plan structure or administration and did not provide alternate enforcement
mechanisms. It is submitted that a state law invalidating an insured ERISA plan
provision as to the procedure for submitting a proof of claim is a law mandating
plan administration. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit has managed to rely upon the
more recent Supreme Court ERISA holdings to narrow the early "relate to" test
and enforce state law without preemption.
V. CONCLUSION
Justice Scalia concluded that the Supreme Court's prior decisions failed to
bring clarity to ERISA preemption law.262 The abundance of case law each
year analyzing ERISA preemption seems to support his conclusion. As the
Supreme Court and the appellate courts continue to develop case law in this area,
it is doubtful that the plethora of ERISA preemption cases will abate. Currently,
preemption jurisprudence lacks consistency and uniformity, an essential goal of
Congress in enacting ERISA. The plethora of preemption jurisprudence and the
difficulties in attaining uniformity will continue because ERISA litigation will
remain a significant part of the dockets of the federal courts. This trend toward
continued expansion of ERISA litigation is fueled by American demographic
trends. As the "Baby Boom" generation ages, there will be increased pressure
placed upon ERISA retirement and welfare plans. Increased ERISA litigation
activity will necessarily follow and force courts to grapple repeatedly with
ERISA preemption. No matter what tests are ultimately adopted to define the
"relate to" clause, the scope, variety, and sheer number of ERISA claims courts
will address in the future will preclude clarity and uniformity in this area of law.
262. See supra notes 211-214 and accompanying text.
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